The information obtained from the test depends on which strategy (from the set of alternatives) is used in that test. The problem is to select a market test strategy that maximizes the expected value of information (adjusted for the cost of the test). The decision maker's attitude toward risk can be incorporated via a nonlinear utility function.
We present a model that enables a manager to evaluate alternative market test strategies and select the optimal strategy, given the manager's current state of knowledge. We focus on the selection of a single optimal market test. More generally, if multiple market tests are feasible, the problem is to design an optimal market test plan that specifies the number of tests to be conducted and the strategy for each test. We discuss this issue subsequently in connection with possible extensions of the model.
We first present the Bayesian decision analytic framework used to conceptualize the problem. We then discuss implementation issues in the context of several actual applications using a personal-computer-based, interactive model, TESTER. The results of one typical application are reported. Next, we employ the model to derive some analytical insights. Finally, limitations and extensions of the model are considered.
THE BAYESIAN DECISION ANALYTIC MODEL
Bayesian analysis has long been suggested as a useful tool to guide market research (Bass 1963; Day et al. 1973; Green 1963 ). Indeed, most basic marketing research texts (e.g., Aaker and Day 1986; Green and Tull 1978; Lehmann 1985) introduce the Bayesian decision analytic framework as a basis for evaluating market research. Blattberg (1979) demonstrates how the framework can be applied to the design and evaluation of advertising experiments. Ginter et al. (1981) provide a theoretical extension of Blattberg's analysis to incorporate statistical risk. Most firms, however, have limited their use of formal Bayesian analysis in marketing applications. Possible reasons are that the analysis typically is computationally cumbersome and various judgmental inputs are required to calibrate the models. The increased use of personal computers may alleviate these problems by enabling managers to use such models interactively.
In applying the Bayesian framework, the researcher must make a tradeoff. An approach involving few or no assumptions about the functional forms of the model components requires the elicitation of many judgmental inputs from the decision maker, then the fitting of a curve through those data points. For the decision problem we consider, such an assumption-free approach results in an arduous elicitation procedure, typically leading to user fatigue and apathy. In contrast, by imposing more structure on the problem and invoking widely accepted assumptions about the various functional forms, one can minimize the amount of time needed to obtain the necessary inputs. We believe that relatively easy estimation of the value of information from alternative testing strategies is desirable. Hence, in calibrating our model with inputs obtained interactively by TESTER, we strive to simplify the respondent's task, consistent with a reasonable model of the situation. TESTER provides graphs of the assumed functions and probability distributions with parameters based on the inputs. In more than 10 applications, decision makers have not found them to be problematic descriptors of their judgments.
Our analysis considers (1) continuously distributed payoffs for each alternative marketing strategy, (2) nonindependence of outcomes associated with the different strategies, implying that a market test employing one strategy may provide useful information not only about payoffs under that strategy, but also about payoffs under other (nontested) strategies, and (3) the decision maker's attitude toward risk. For ease of exposition, we first present the model without considering attitude toward risk. This model can be viewed as a special case of the more general model, under the assumption that management is risk neutral. We then extend this model to incorporate the manager's attitude toward risk.
Problem Definition
A firm is considering a set {1, 2, ..., n} of mutually exclusive marketing strategies either for a product launch or as alternatives to the present strategy for a current product. Examples include price levels, product profiles, advertising strategies, and distribution options. Some decision variables (such as price) are inherently continuous; however, managers commonly consider discrete levels of these variables when evaluating their strategic options. The strategy set includes the status quo option as the nth alternative (i.e., "no go" for the product launch case or "present strategy" with often known market response for a current product), which serves as the baseline. The market response to each of these strategies (other than the status quo alternative) is uncertain.
Managers can either select a strategy without conducting a market test or conduct a test before choosing a strategy. The problem is to select which strategy (from the n -1 possibilities, excluding the status quo alternative), if any, should be tested before choosing the strategy for implementation. (If the market response to the current strategy is uncertain because of changed market conditions, all n options-including the current strategy-are candidates for testing.) Figure 1 is the decision tree corresponding to the problem. A complete list of notations is provided in the Appendix.
Because the manager is uncertain of the market response to the various strategies, the payoffs (profits) are uncertain and denoted by the random variable fri (profit under strategy i).' The prior probability density function of profit, f(-ri) (i = 1, ..., n), represents the manager's knowledge of the effectiveness of the various strategies 'The tilde denotes a random variable. For example, If, is a random variable and 7r, is a specific realization of that random variable. before any test is conducted. Thus, if a strategy were to be chosen without further evaluation, the decision would be based on the manager's prior distributiion of fri for i = 1 ., ., n. We now consider the possibility of testing, and hence observing, additional information before the selection of a strategy for full-scale implementation. Figure 1 shows the chronological sequence of decisions (denoted by boxes) and events (circles). The manager first chooses a test strategy, say alternativej. Let Tj denote the unbiased national (or "full-scale") projection of sales in units observed in the market test under strategy j. (The issue of systematic bias is discussed subsequently.) At this point, the outcome of the test is uncertain and hence denoted by the random variable T, with probability density function f(Tj). Once the test is conducted and the outcome Ti observed, the manager updates his or her knowledge about the effectiveness of various strategies, represented by the posterior probability density function f(rrlTj), for i = 1, ..., n. This posterior distribution then becomes the basis for selecting the firm's strategy.
To derive the posterior distribution of profit under alternative strategies, we must specify (1) the prior distribution of sales, (2) the reliability of the market test, and (3) the relationship (dependence) among outcomes under different strategies. These elements of the problem are discussed next.
Prior distribution of sales. Let Si denote the sales in units associated with strategy i. We capture the manager's current knowledge about response to a particular strategy i via the prior probability density function of Si. More specifically, our analysis begins by assuming that the manager's prior assessment of sales in response to strategy i is represented by the normal distribution
where pRi and o2 are the mean and variance, respectively, of the prior distribution of Si. The normal distribution assumption has been accepted widely as a robust model that can serve as a good approximation to many other distributions (Johnson and Kotz 1970; Winkler 1972 ). The normality assumption does imply that, conceptually, there is a nonzero probability of sales being negative, though in practice sales cannot be negative. However, the values of pRi and ai in actual applications are such that the coefficient of variation
is sufficiently small that the possibility of Si being negative is negligible. For example, for the empirical application discussed in the next section, the order of the coefficients of variation implies that, under the normal distribution assumption, the probability of negative sales is less than 10-10. In practical situations where the coefficient of variation is not sufficiently small, the manager's prior probability density function can be captured by a doubly symmetric truncated normal distribution (Johnson and Kotz 1970, p. 83) instead of the complete normal distribution. The analysis proceeds in an almost identical manner as with the complete normal distribu-tion, except for the incorporation of adjustment factors for the variance and inflator factors to ensure proper probability densities. The normal distribution also implies symmetry about the mean. An extension of our framework to incorporate a more flexible (possibly skewed) distribution over non-negative values of sales is conceptually possible. However, it involves computational complexities and a more tedious assessment procedure, especially in our analysis of the impact of testing on the evaluation of nontested strategies (requiring consideration of correlations between outcomes under the different strategies). Consequently, we adhere to the decision calculus model-building criteria proposed by Little (1970) and strive for managerial acceptance.
Reliability In practice, the market test outcome may provide a biased estimate of sales; for example, tests often overproject sales, possibly as a result of a Hawthorne effect. Other factors (such as unusual levels of competitive activity) also may affect the test results. To the extent the manager can assess a systematic bias attributable to these factors, the actual test results can-and should-be adjusted for that bias. Thus, if Ti is the "raw" projection of the observed market test outcome and bj is the assessed systematic bias, then (4) Tj = TJ? -bJ.
Note that the uncertain (or "random") element of the impact of these factors becomes a component of the random error term, j, and reduces the reliability of the test. Non-independence of outcomes. In general, information about response to a particular strategy may influence the state of knowledge about the market response to that strategy, as well as alternative strategies. For example, given information about sales response to a $2.99 per unit price level, managers would be likely to revise their assessment of sales under a $1.49 per unit pricing strategy. The implication is that, for any pair of strategies, {ij}, the corresponding (uncertain) sales, Si and Si, may be correlated. Let pij denote the correlation between Si and S9, for i, j = 1, ..., n. In practice, we would usually expect pij to be non-negative, though conceptually the model places no restrictions on the sign of p1i (for i ' j). We assume that the joint distribution of Si and Sj (for i # j) and the joint distribution of S, and Tj (recall that Tj = SJ + j) are bivariate normal.
The parameters of the prior distribution of sales (?Li, rf2), the reliability of the market test (1/18), and the pairwise correlations between sales associated with different strategies (pij) are either obtained directly or derived from inputs elicited from managers.
Evaluation of Alternative Test Strategies
Given our specification of the problem, we can now evaluate the alternative test strategies represented by the branches of the decision tree in Figure 1 .
Consider first the "no-test" option (node lA in Figure   1 ). If a strategy were to be selected without additional evaluation, the strategy i* with the highest expected profit should be selected. That is, the decision is to choose i* such that Note that the margins and fixed costs are assumed to be known. In practice, managers are more likely to be uncertain about sales response than about costs. Uncertainty about the cost structure, however, can be accommodated by the framework. We next turn to the "test" option. To determine which strategy (if any) should be tested, we must evaluate the branches representing the test alternatives by "folding back" the decision tree.
Posterior analysis. We begin at node 2 of the decision tree in Figure 1 . Assume that some strategy j has been tested and the market test outcome, Tj, observed. In this case, the optimal decision (at node 2) is to select strategy i* that maximizes expected profit given the test outcome: where f(Tj) is the probability density function of Tl. Note that in the computation of the expected profit one assumes that the optimal strategy will be implemented once Tj is observed. In general, the optimal strategy for full-scale implementation depends on the specific outcome of the test. We therefore must identify which strategy is best for different values of Tj over its entire range. More formally, we divide the range of Tj into a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive segments such that, for each segment, one particular strategy (identified by equation 7) is best over the entire segment.
Determining the optimal market test strategy. Once the expected profits have been determined, we can compare the test options. The expected profit in each case must be adjusted for the cost of testing. Thus, the optimal decision (at node IB of the decision tree) is to select strategy j* for the market test such that In evaluating strategies under risk aversion, we consider the certainty equivalents of uncertain profits instead of the expected values.
Under the "no-test" option, the strategy i* with the highest certainty equivalent should be selected. That is, the decision is to choose i* such that (Leamer 1978; Winkler 1967a,b) . Managers' judgments are assessed and sensitivity analysis is performed on the parameters for which the assessment uncertainty may be great.
To assess the prior probability distribution, two points of the distribution (fractiles) are assessed and then the parameters of the normal distribution probability density function can be determined. For example, the decision maker may be asked: To assess the reliability of the test market, managers are asked to assume that the level of sales in units would be the mean of the prior distribution and that, if the test were perfectly reliable, the nationally projected test outcome would exactly equal this value. Then they are asked to provide an optimistic and a pessimistic estimate of the test market sales outcome, projected to the national (or full-scale) level, in units. The standard deviation 8i, an inverse measure of the test reliability, is determined similarly to ui.3 TESTER has been used by decision makers in several industries including pharmaceuticals, mortgage services, and telecommunications. For expository purposes, we report a typical application in which TESTER evaluated two possible advertising programs for a well-established consumer packaged good. The user, the director of marketing research, had recently been a brand manager for this product, which we call "Old Reliable." Figure 2 shows the input data needed to evaluate the two strategic options: an advertising budget of $38 million versus a lower budget of $29 million (all data have been multiplied by a constant for confidentiality). This manager had greater uncertainty about his sales estimate for the lower advertising strategy. The tests considered for evaluation were instrumented markets. In these markets, scanner panel members would be exposed to different advertising levels for a 1-year period. The statistical reliability of the tests depended on the sample size of the panels and the market share of Old Reliable. Reliability estimates given by the firm providing the instrumented markets were based on analysis of the various experimental results in their experience base.
To assess the correlations pi,, the following question is asked.
Assume you marketed the product under strategy i and found that the sales were 10% higher than your current expectation. To what extent would you revise your expectation of sales under strategy j?
The conditional expectation of SjISi is given by ( TESTER concluded that if the test projected national sales greater than 9,848,321 units, the lower advertising level should be adopted; otherwise, the higher level should be used.
In the next analysis, the manager's attitude toward risk was assessed with a procedure proposed by Eliashberg and Hauser (1985) . A series of 10 simple binary choice problems is presented sequentially to the manager, who chooses the preferred alternative in each case. The profit associated with either alternative is uncertain. In the first alternative, there is a probability a of obtaining a profit level x, and a probability 1 -a of obtaining zero profit. For the second alternative, there is a probability P of obtaining a profit level x2 and a probability 1 -P of obtaining zero profit. The probabilities and profit levels are specified in each choice problem. The parameters (a, 3, x1, and x2) are varied across the problems and their values chosen so that the following relationship holds. In this application, the estimated parameter P indicated a high degree of risk aversion. When the manager's risk aversion was incorporated, the recommendation (to test the lower advertising strategy) remained unchanged (see Table 2 ). However, the value (cash equivalent) of the market test increased to $511,058 (in comparison with $473,446 when risk attitude was not considered). In this case, TESTER recommended that the lower advertising strategy be adopted only if the national sales projection of the test outcome exceeds 9,832,588 units (in comparison with 9,848,321 units).
These results illustrate the impact of risk attitude on decision making. Once the test outcome is observed, the 3The assessment procedure effectively anchors the mean of the distribution of the test outcome to IX; more specifically, the procedure asks the respondent to consider 7.IS, = -~ N(R, s]), where Ri is given and Bj is the parameter to be assessed. risk averse manager should be more likely to select the less risky strategy. After the test of the lower advertising strategy, the (posterior) uncertainty associated with this strategy becomes lower than that of the other strategy. Therefore, under risk aversion, the "critical value" of the test outcome (above which adoption of the lower advertising strategy is recommended) is lower in relation to the risk neutral case. Other uses of TESTER include evaluations of a new form of an orange drink, different price levels for a pharmaceutical product, and distribution systems for a new mortgage service. In these applications the value of information was higher once the managers' risk attitude was considered. Incorporating risk attitude also changed the cutoff point(s) of the test outcome ("critical value(s)") determining the optimal strategy to be implemented once the test result is observed. Overall, our experience with TESTER suggests that managers are comfortable with the model calibration procedure and the recommendations obtained from the analysis.
Figure 2 ASSESSMENT OF PRIORS AND TEST RELIABILITIES

THE VALUE OF A TEST-SOME
ANALYTICAL INSIGHTS The Bayesian model has several analytical implications in terms of the expected value or cash equivalent of information obtained from testing a particular strategy. For ease of exposition, we consider two strategies, each with uncertain market response. Our objective is to obtain some managerially useful insights into the impact of the following key elements of our model on the value of information: the, prior expectation of profitability as well as the uncertainty associated with either strategy, the test reliability, and the correlation between sales under the two strategies. These insights suggest conditions under which a market test may or may not be worthwhile.
In the risk neutral case, strategies are evaluated in terms of expected profit; when risk aversion is explicitly considered, the criterion for evaluation is the certainty This result is intuitive. A market test is most valuable when the two strategies are roughly equally attractive (in terms of prior expected profit or, under risk aversion, prior certainty equivalent of profit). When one strategy is clearly superior to the other, a market test is expected to be less worthwhile because the optimal strategy for implementation is unlikely to change. This implication is consistent with recommendations on testing in the literature (e.g., Urban and Hauser 1980). We also would expect to learn more if the test were more reliable or if the prior uncertainty of the strategy being tested were higher.
Result 1 pertains to the value of testing a particular strategy. To decide which of the two strategies (if either) should be tested, we would like to know which strategy has the higher expected value (cash equivalent) of information associated with its test. The answer depends Note that the prior uncertainty in terms of profit depends on the prior uncertainty in sales and the unit contribution.5 Managers often are faced with the problem of choosing between strategies roughly similar in terms of prior expected profit (prior certainty equivalent of profit under risk aversion), but where one strategy has a higher unit contribution as well as higher fixed costs. If the strategies are about equally uncertain in terms of market response (sales), the high contribution strategy (which is riskier in terms of profitability) should be tested. In other situations (where the conditions in result 2 do not hold), the choice of the optimal test strategy involves a tradeoff and the criterion in footnote 4 can be employed.
It is the prior uncertainty, not the prior expectation (certainty equivalent) of profit, that determines which strategy (if any) should be tested, though the difference between the prior expectations (certainty equivalents) affects the expected value (cash equivalent) of information of both tests. If this difference is very large, neither test may be worthwhile. If the more uncertain strategy is considered for testing, the impact of the prior uncertainty of the other strategy and of the correlation between sales under the two strategies on the value of the test (in addition to the factors considered in result 1) is:
Result 3. If the strategy having the higher prior uncertainty of profit is considered for testing, the expected value (cash equivalent) of information from the test is greater when (1) the prior uncertainty of profit associated with the other strategy is low and (2) the correlation between sales under the two strategies is low.
The intuition behind this result is less obvious. The value of a test is related directly to the likelihood that the test will change the optimal strategy selection decision or, equivalently, the likelihood that the order of the strategies in terms of expected (certainty equivalent of) profits will be reversed when the test result is incorporated to update the priors. This likelihood depends on the differential impact of the test outcome on the posterior expectations (certainty equivalents) of profits under the two strategies. The differential impact is the greatest when the prior uncertainty of profit under the nontested strategy and the correlation are low.
Thus, an "ideal" scenario, in which the expected value (cash equivalent) of information is likely to be very high, is one in which the two strategies are very similar in terms of prior expectation (certainty equivalent) of profit, but very different in terms of prior uncertainty of profit. In this situation, a test of the more risky strategy should be very worthwhile.
The manager's attitude toward risk may have a less significant role in determining a priori the choice of the optimal testing strategy than in determining the choice 4The criterion for determining which strategy has the higher expected value (cash equivalent) of information associated with its test is given by the condition 
CONCLUSIONS
We present a Bayesian model to evaluate market tests of alternative strategies and identify which strategy (if any) should be tested. Our model incorporates continuous distributions of uncertain outcomes that represent the problem realistically and minimize the amount of information researchers must obtain from managers. The model also explicitly takes into account the non-independence of market responses to various alternative strategies-an important consideration because the market responds to variables that are not tested explicitly and are common across strategies. For example, when one is considering alternative pricing strategies for a new product, the product itself is common across strategies. In such situations, it is imperative that the prior distributions of payoffs associated with nontested strategies be revised on the basis of the outcome of a test of a particular strategy. Finally, the model explicitly considers the decision maker's attitude toward risk.
The empirical application reported illustrates the approach to eliciting responses from the manager to calibrate the model and provides an example of the information that can be gained from TESTER. This application, and others not reported in detail here, demonstrate the feasibility of using such a decision aid, based on a Bayesian decision analytic approach, with an interactive program on a personal computer. Managers have found the experience of interacting with TESTER useful. In particular, the interactive process triggers questions that yield new insights into the decision problem.
Future Research
Further empirical experience with TESTER and feedback from managers may suggest refinements in the elicitation procedures currently used for model calibration. To keep the respondent's task as simple as possible, we chose to seek only the minimal essential inputs for model calibration. The normal distributions for prior sales and market test outcomes under different strategies, based on the inputs, are presented to the manager by the interactive model for an assessment of their face validity. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis can be performed to determine the sensitivity of TESTER's recommendations to the input parameters. It is possible to elicit additional points on the distribution and thereby obtain a goodnessof-fit measure to assess the validity of the normal distribution assumption and/or the reliability of the parameters. In practical terms, however, we believe the face validity check and sensitivity analysis are more appropriate in our context. In our applications, the normal distribution assumption appears robust and the potential limitations (allowance of negative values and symmetry about the mean) have not posed a problem.
An approach to enhancing the model would be to develop an option that relaxes some of the assumptions about the functional forms. This option would require deeper questions for calibration, but would be used only when sensitivity analysis indicates more detailed data are needed. It would leverage the methodology without imposing excessive respondent burden.
Further extensions of the model include the analysis of multiple market tests (under different strategies) and the incorporation of uncertain cost structures. The model currently focuses on the selection of a single optimal market test. In practice, it may be possible to conduct market tests of several strategies. Such multiple tests are frequently observed, with companies experimenting, for example, with different price levels or advertising strategies in different test markets. Thus the problem can be generalized to one of designing an optimal market test plan that specifies the number of tests to be conducted simultaneously and the strategy to be tested. The problem also can be modified to consider sequential testing plans.
Our model currently considers a finite set of strategies, with discrete levels of marketing mix variables. The model can be extended to incorporate a continuous strategy space for variables such as price or advertising expenditure. Such a model would employ a sales response function whose parameters (e.g., price sensitivity) are uncertain. Identification of the optimal strategy would be based on maximization of the (continuous) objective function incorporating these parameters. Random variables are denoted by the tilde sign; for
